Central Intelligence Agency



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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE VECENT LAR article or

Maluf and Towcredo. ) 5 November 1984

## The Brazilian Presidential Elections

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Brazil's next president is to be chosen by a 686-member electoral college, which is scheduled to convene in open session on 15 January. college comprises 479 federal deputies, 69 senators, and six additional delegates from each of the 23 states. Electors vote individually, rather than--as in the US winner-take-all system--by state blocs.

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The electoral college system, devised by Brazil's military rulers in the 1960s, has been viewed by the current regime as a means of ensuring a measure of control over the transition to civilian rule and the choice of President Figueiredo's successor. Brasilia added the requirement for state delegates, who are to be chosen by the majority party in each state legislature, before the gubernatorial and congressional elections of 1982 -- the first direct popular elections since 1965. Fearing opposition victories in the industrial, urban states of the central and southern regions, the Figueiredo administration counted on the government party's traditional strength in the rural northeast to guarantee its dominance in a majority of the states. Although opposition parties won 10 governorships and control over several state legislatures, the government party emerged with a 30-vote margin in the electoral college.

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## The Electoral Process

Events, however, have eroded the regime's ability to manipulate the coming election. A three-year recession, a financial payments crisis, and Figueiredo's inept leadership have sparked public dissatisfaction, galvanized the opposition, and encouraged rebellion within the government's own party. Although the administration managed to beat back an attempt earlier this year to provide for direct presidential elections, Figueiredo proved unable to impose his choice as the government party's

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candidate. Instead, Paulo Malufa Congressman reported Presidentcarefully built a network of friends and allie personal contacts and the distribution of favors and in A party's nomination. Moreover, Vice President Chaves led some 60 government party Congressmen to support Tancredo Governor of Minas Gerais and now the opposition candidate	es through August won the a defection of Neves, the former
Swallowing his distaste for Maluf, Figueiredo ordere officials to support the party's candidate and sacked a who refused.	ed all government cabinet officer the 25X
disintegration of the government party has continued. So northeastern governors recently endorsed Neves, throwing government party's ability to control the delegates from	everal into doubt the
	25X <sup>2</sup>
The opposition's strategy has been to portray Maluf of a discredited regime while identifying Neves with popular change. Because the electoral college balloting will opposition apparently believes many Congressmen, all of reelection in 1986, will hesitate to vote for Maluf. Put consistently show a marked popular preference for Neves, about 3 to 1, and the government party's candidate has mealmost every campaign appearance. US Embassy and press that Neves has about a 100-vote lead among electoral college.	ular aspirations I be open, the whom face olic opinion polls by a margin of et hostility at reporting indicate
Nonetheless, Maluf has not given up.	25X <sup>2</sup>
Maluf is trying to satisfy the demands of delegates in return for their support. He also is seeking changes that would enhance his chances and	of individual 25X° ng procedural 25X°
remains confident he will triumph by a narrow margin.	25X
Prospects	
We believe Neves will win the election and be instanced president. Maluf, however, retains at least an outsecoring an upset in the electoral college. He has overcoodds in past contests, and his personal lobbying may attributed to edge Neves, particularly if any of his process, pay off.	side chance of ome substantial ract enough
A Neves victory almost certainly would be viewed as public will, and the new administration would enjoy broad triumph by Maluf, on the other hand, would be ascribed to of the unpopular Figueiredo regime, and much of the popular	d support. A  the machinations
disaffected from the outset.	25)

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Although the armed forces have shown concern for Neves's ties to leftist groups, they apparently are confident he will not threaten their institutional interests, and therefore they seem reconciled to an opposition victory. Nonetheless, the military clearly intends to play an active political role under the civilian regime, and its recent public warnings and moves against the left probably were intended to put both the traditional politicians and the extremists on notice that there will be no return to the radicalism of the early 1960s.

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